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Folk-psychology has not yet reached the happy condition of " the
ship that found herself." Its scope, its method, are matters of
dispute, its raison d'etre even is in some quarters accepted with hesita-
tion. It would hardly be profitable to discuss here the methodological
and terminological questions involved; some of the more important
issues, however, will be incidentally touched on in the course of this
review.
Thurnwald (12) observes that in primitive conditions there can
be no question of formal legal categories; savage law is simply savage
custom looked at from a certain point of view. It follows that we
cannot make use of our own legal abstractions in describing the legal
forms of primitive folk. He further notes that savages do not always
live up to their reputation as good observers; the people of Buin
(Bougainville, Melanesia), for instance, are unaware of the connection
between the caterpillar and the butterfly. The inhabitants of the
Gazelle Peninsula assert that children found in the bush are the fruit
of a liana. Thus we need not wonder at the ignorance of some
peoples with reference to the processes of sexual conception; an igno-
rance which results in multiform whimsical beliefs as to the relations
between man and plants and animals. Thurnwald's remarks about
blood revenge in Melanesia are interesting. The avenger may meet
his victim in open combat or he may suddenly attack him from
ambush. Nor is it necessary for the act of vengeance to occur at once
or within a defined period. If the offender is strong and powerful,
well protected and hard to get at, vengeance may be postponed for
months and years; but sooner or later the fatal blow will fall.
Kroeber (7) points out that the still current belief that conduct
may be determined by ideas or reason is a delusion. The opposition
also to some actions, as cannibalism, incest, lack of parental or filial
devotion, "is so thoroughly instinctive that these crimes have hardly
had to be dealt with by most people, and their rarity and want of
infectiousness are recognized in the failure of creeds and codes to
provide against them." While the horror of incest, pollution, etc., is
common to all people, the ideas as to what constitutes incest or
pollution vary greatly from place to place and from time to time.
Stumpf (10) criticizes Darwin's theory of the origin of music from
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song; Spencer's theory of its origin from emotional speech; Wal-
laschek's, from dancing; Biicher's, from communal labor. Music, for
Stumpf, is characterized by definitely fixed but transposable intervals.
The origin of music he finds in vocal signs at a distance. Thus
certain sounds became fixed in pitch and were sustained longer than in
ordinary speech. Later, intervals, beginning probably with the
octave, arose. Religious motives may have cooperated in the early
development of music. Stumpf gives valuable bibliographic refer-
ences and a collection of primitive songs and tunes.1
Thurnwald attempts to characterize the mental atmosphere
{Denkart) reflected in totemism (u) . He also emphasizes the social
aspect of that institution. "Der Totemismus ist eine sociologische
Theorie, die auf einer bestimmten Naturauffassung von den Existenz-
bedingungen des Menschen basiert ist." And again, "Von Tote-
mismus aber sollte man nur dann reden, wenn Anzeichen vorhanden
sind, die auf eine durch die geschilderte eigenartige Denkart beein-
flusste soziale Gestaltung schliessen lassen."
Sapir (9) draws attention to some common elements in all lan-
guages, such as a fixed phonetic system and a definite grammatical
structure. With reference to older theories of the origin of speech
he observes that "we are forced to conclude that the existence of
onomatopoetic and exclamatory features is as little correlated with
relative primitiveness as we have found the use of gesture to be."
The probable origin of phonetic changes is seen in the inexact imita-
tion by children of the pronunciation of elders. Some of the phonetic
variants thus produced are imitated by others until either the entire
language is changed phonetically or a separate dialect arises. It
seems that the time-honored characterization of languages as inflec-
tional, agglutinative, etc., must be set aside. We may speak of
derivative elements in language, elements which affect only the form
of the word, and of relational elements which, while affecting the form
of the word, also affect its relation to other parts of the sentence,
which, in consequence, also change. In this connection "it is im-
portant to note that, although the distinction between derivational
and relational grammatical elements we have made is clearly reflected
1
 The value of music for folk-psychology has only recently been realized, and the
number of careful studies on the subject is exceedingly small. Professor Stumpf and
his excellent colaborrators, Abraham and von Hornbostel, are pioneers in this work.
I must here refer to his Beitrdge zur Akustik und Musikwissenschaft (6), which reached
me too late for a more detailed review. Sapir's " Song Recitative in Paiute Mythology"
(/. of Amer. Folk-lore, 1910, 23, 455-473) should also be consulted for interesting
hints as to some specific relations between primitive music and mythology.
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in some way or other in most languages, they differ a great deal as to
what particular logical concepts are treated as respectively deriva-
tional and relational."1
Rivers (8) insists that in many instances where primitive beliefs
contain apparent contradictions, these resolve themselves into per-
fectly logical sequences if allowance is made for the fact that natural
phenomena "have been classified and arranged into categories differ-
ent from those of ourselves." A case in point is afforded by the
Melanesian concepts of life and death, which do not coincide with
our own but are expressed by the terms mate and toa, one including
with the dead the very sick and the very aged, while the other excludes
from the living those who are called mate. Rivers believes that the
states "on either side of this condition of mateness" are much less
different, to the primitive mind, than are for us the states indicated
by the terms life and death. Death to the primitive man is a form
of existence, and " the difference between the two existences is prob-
ably of much the same order to the primitive mind as two stages of
his life, say the stages before and after his initiation into manhood."2
Boas (2), in his Clark University lecture, deals with the psycho-
logical problems in the study of ethnology. On the one hand the
anthropologist seeks to reconstruct the historical development of
cultures; on the other hand he is interested in the psychological laws
underlying the thought and action of man, in different racial and
social groups. On close analysis the "composite pictures" of the
mental make-up of different races would probably reveal significant
differences. The performance of individuals belonging to a given
group may to some extent depend on hereditary individual and racial
ability, but in the main it depends on the habitual characteristics of
the social group to which the individual belongs. The main diffi-
culty with the comparative method commonly used by ethnologists
is the incomparability of the data on which the conclusions are based.
"The person, for instance, who slays an enemy in revenge for wrongs
1
 It becomes increasingly apparent that the field of primitive languages will soon
prove a treasure-trove to the folk-psychologist. For quite apart from the value of
language as a mirror of culture, the classification of experience and the categories of
concepts unconsciously expressed in the grammatical structure, vocabulary, and even
phonetics, of a language, and which are now being laid bare by the student, promise
to reveal to us the sanctum of mental life, the laboratory of thought itself. I commend
to the attention of psychologists the Handbook of American Indian Languages (Bulletin
40 of the Bureau of Ethnology).
* Levy-Bruhl has reached much the same conclusion in his Les Fonctions Mentales
des Societes Inferieures. See the present writer's remarks on Rivers and Levy-Bruhl
in Current Anthropological Literature, 1912.
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done, a youth who kills his father before he gets decrepit in order to
enable him to continue a vigorous life in the world to come, a father
who kills his child as a sacrifice for the welfare of his people, act from
such entirely different motives that psychologically a comparison of
their activities does not seem permissible." Thus two phenomena
are culturally similar, not when they reveal objective resemblances,
but when the underlying psychological processes are similar.1
The classification of experience underlying the thought of differ-
ent groups of men is thoroughly different. This classification of
experience is not due to any ratiocinative process but occurs uncon-
sciously. The best example of classifications which do not rise into
consciousness is offered by the grammatical categories of languages;
but it is no less plausible that some of the fundamental concepts
of religion as well as of other cultural phenomena, have arisen in the
same unconscious way; with the difference that in the latter instances
the fundamental concepts, and in part the underlying classifications,
tend to rise into consciousness. The subsequent conscious elabora-
tion of the concept leads to secondary explanations, the study of
which constitutes a highly important branch of ethnology.
Woodworth (14) examines the same facts from a somewhat differ-
ent angle. He warns against the hasty assumption of specialized
mental traits in different groups. "The circumstances surrounding
a group call for certain special abilities and bring to the fore indi-
viduals possessing these abilities, leaving in comparative obscurity
those gifted in other directions." Woodworth dismisses with little
ceremony the oft made assertions that savages are deficient in rea-
soning powers, that they are incapable of abstraction, of foresight.
The difference in these respects between the savage and civilized is
only one of degree. The author proceeds to analyze the results of
investigations on the senses of savages conducted by Rivers, Mc-
Dougall and Myers, among the islanders of Torres Straits, and of
his own experiments with several primitive groups at the St. Louis
Fair in 1904. In the light of these data the sense superiority of the
savage is as much of an illusion as his mental inferiority seems to be.
Woodworth thus reaches the conclusion that the progress made by a
group cannot be conceived as determined solely by its intellectual
endowment. "The spur of necessity, the opportunities afforded by
leisure, the existing stock of knowledge and inventions, and the
factor of apparent accident or luck have all to be considered."
1
 Boas has emphasized this point of view in several previous publications as well
as in his recent The Mind of Primitive Man. (See special review on p. 404.)
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Graebner (5) lays down the principles of the science of ethnology
and the method of ethnological inquiry. We are particularly con-
cerned with pp. 62—124 °f his work. He starts out with the proposi-
tion that two cultural phenomena possess the greatest mutual inter-
pretative value if they belong to the same cultural complex. If then
we want to interpret ciilturt # 1 MUlit reconstruct the cultural com-
plexes that have developed, spread and fused in the course of the
historic process. This is the main aim of ethnology. The geo-
graphical separation of cultural areas complicates our investigations,
but it should not in principle affect our attitude towards cultural
similarities. As independent development of similarities in culture
is rare and convergent, evolution is to a large extent an imaginary
process; such cultural similarities, however distant geographically,
must be interpreted as due to historic contact, and, in the last analy-
sis, to genetic relationship. The actually existing cultures which
confront the ethnologist are valuable to Graebner only in so far as
they constitute the points of departure for his cultural reconstruc-
tions. Needless to say, all intensive analysis of the interplay of
psychic forces in any given cultural area does not, for Graebner,
fall within the scope of the ethnologist's task. There is no more
room for the soul in Graebner's system than there was for God in the
universe of Laplace.1
We must pass by without comment Ankermann (1) who is a
more cautious representative of the "historical" school of ethnology,
and Foy (4) whose position is even more extreme than that of
Graebner.
Boas (3) characterizes Graebner's system as "mechanical."
He sees safe progress in " the patient unravelling of the mental proc-
esses that may be observed among primitive and civilized peoples,
and that express the actual conditions under which cultural forms
develop. When we begin to know these we shall also be able to pro-
ceed gradually to more difficult problems of the cultural relations
between isolated areas that exhibit peculiar similarities." The
>The full significance of Graebner's methods as well as their bearings on the
problems of folk-psychology cannot be fully appreciated without acquaintance with his
concrete investigations. See particularly his "Die Melanesische Bogenkultur"
(Anthropos, 1909), "Die Wanderungen socialer Systeme in Australien" (Globus, 1906),
and "Die socialen Systeme der Siidsee" (Zsch. f. Socialwissensch., 1908). Also
Graebner's and Foy's discussion with Haberlandt in Petermann's Mitteilungen, March
and May, 1911. Dixon meets Graebner on his own ground in "The Independence of
the Culture of the American Indian" (Science, 1912, 35, No. 889). Lowie defends
the principle of convergence against Graebner's challenge of its non-existence (/. of
Amer. Folk-lore, 1912).
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significance of cultural phenomena lies in their psychological setting.
Against Graebner, Boas maintains "that certain types of changes
due to internal forces have been observed everywhere."
Wundt (15) once more formulates his conception of folk-psy-
chology. Although it is true that no psychic process may occur
outside an individual consciousness, many processes in the individual
mind cannot be properly understood when abstracted from their
social context. The metaphysical concept of a soul and the fiction
of "laws" must be set aside. The soul is naught but the sum total
of psychic experience; the psychic laws are the regularities of that
experience. If so much is granted, the ethnic soul (Folksseele)
becomes as proper a field for psychological investigation as is the
individual soul. Particular developmental processes become the
subject-matter of folk-psychology only in so far as they contain
common elements based on the psychic unity of man, a condition
represented by remote social origins. In later stages, as outer
and inner social forces increase in particularity, number and variety,
the common fundamental psychic motives become obscured and
are carried off with the flood of historic conditions. Thus folk-
psychology and individual psychology constitute the foundation of
history, not vice versa. Individual psychology furnishes the clue
for the solution of folk-psychological problems; folk-psychology,
on the other hand, itself supplies valuable material for individual
psychology. Thus linguistic phenomena throw light on the proc-
esses of thinking; mythology, on the workings of imagination;
custom, on the nature of will.
A number of German psychologists and ethnologists contribute a
set of suggestions for the psychological study of primitive peoples.
Thurnwald (13) joins Levy-Bruhl in advocating the necessity of a psy-
chological characterization of ethnic groups.1
Hayes (6), in a series of articles, champions the psychological
view of society. He analyzes the views of Tarde, Spencer, de Greef,
Fairbanks, Ross, Giddings. "Society," he defines, "is in essence
the interrelated activities of men," and activities are psychic facts,
while the connotations of the term "interrelated" are, in this con-
nection, also psychic. Wundt's view as to the relation of individual
to social psychology is endorsed. "Individual" psychology is really
"general" psychology, for it deals with what is universal in man.
"It is sociology that investigates the building up of the content of
consciousness which differs at different times and places, the indi-
1
 See special review on p. 400.
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vidual's share in which constitutes his individual life, a life composed
of activities which have been socially evolved and which by each
individual are socially derived. The individual is a concrete, com-
plex, unanalyzed sample of the social reality." In criticizing Gid-
dings, Hayes repudiates the time-honored view of society "as a
population of human organisms, under political control, inhabiting
a given territory." 1
The narrow limits of this review prevent me from treating this
problem of the objective versus the psychic method of studying
man and society with the care it deserves. I believe that ethnologists
as well as sociologists are divided over the question. We see a some-
what striking example of convergence in thinking in that the psy-
chologist and the professional philosopher also find themselves facing
a similar situation. I refer to such works as Thorndike's Animal
Intelligence (1911), particularly the last two chapters; the introductory
chapters of Pillsbury's The Essentials of Psychology; the whole of
McDougall's Introduction to Social Psychology; as well as the dis-
cussions at the recent meeting of the American Philosophical Asso-
ciation, in Cambridge. The situation is fascinating and somewhat
ominous. Need we fear that the word Geisteswissenschaften will
reveal itself as a contradiction in terms?
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THE PRIMITIVE RACES IN AMERICA
BY DR. FRANK G. BRUNER
Department of Child Study, Board of Education, Chicago
The literature relating, specifically, to the psychology of the
primitive races in America, during the past two or three years, is
exceedingly meager, and indeed in most cases its psychological
bearing is rather indirect.
In Part I. of the Handbook of the American Indian Languages (1)
an attempt is made to bring together material bearing on the mor-
phology and phonetics of the American languages with a view, ulti-
mately, of organizing an analytical grammar. When more material
has been collected in subsequent volumes, an attempt will be made
to get hold of the phonetic processes involved in these languages,
so as to discover the psychological foundations of their structure.
Boas, in the introduction of eighty-three pages, traces the sig-
nificant social and psychological influences which have been factors
in modifying phonal, articulatory and language complexes. His
study brings out the fact that there is little correlation between lan-
guage, material culture, and anatomical structure when these three
elements are employed, respectively, to determine ethnic relation-
ship between groups of people. A difference in physical type, and
customs, is noted when the language is common; or one finds the
anatomical type the same, but the language and the social customs
at wide variance, and so on. This makes it fairly certain that sets
of influences may act now in one direction and now in another. Boas's
conclusion is that the biological unit is safest as being the most in-
clusive and permanent, since, obviously, anatomical structure reacts
